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A NEW STRATEGY TO COMBAT RACIAL INEQUALITY
IN AMERICAN HEALTH CARE DELIVERY
Dayna Bowen Matthew'
"Of all the forms of inequality, injustice in healthcare
is the most shocking and inhumane."
-

Martin Luther

King, Jr.
The statistical 2 and anecdotal 3 evidence of racial inequality in
American healthcare is undisputable. Since 2003 when the Institute of
Medicine report entitled "Unequal Treatment" widely circulated a
compelling body of research and data to demonstrate systemic as well
as clinical 4 discrimination, 5 health professionals, lawmakers, and
Associate Professor and Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, University of
Colorado School of Law. I am grateful for the support of the National Academy of
Social Insurance for providing financial and intellectual support for this research. I
am also indebted to Professor Timothy Jost for his support and for encouragement as
he challenged my thinking on this project along the way. I thank Professors Emily
Calhoun, Michele Goodwin, Melissa Hart, Pierre Schlag and Sidney Watson for their
very helpful comments on earlier drafts. I owe Professor Goodwin special thanks for
giving me a forum in which to present and discuss these ideas at the DePaul Institute
of Health Law and Policy; she has been an inspiration and friend throughout this
project. Finally, I owe a debt of thanks to my research assistant, Adam Romney
whose exceptional research and hard work will be sorely missed as he graduates and
begins his legal career this year. I will watch in wonder as you begin now to chart
your stars, Adam; God's speed!
2 See CENTER FOR HEALTH EQUITY RESEARCH AND PROMOTION, Intro
to Health
DisparitiesPrimer,http://www.cherp.org/index.php.
3 Sidney D. Watson, Reinvigorating Title VI: Defending Health Care Discrimination
- It Shouldn't Be So Easy, 58 FORDHAM L. REv. 939, 939 (1990). Professor Sidney
D. Watson has regularly reported examples of health care injustice that should shock
any conscience. Id. Professor Watson begins with stories of Mrs. Carolyn Payne,
Infant Ysidro Aguinags and an unnamed Hispanic man. Id. However, Professor
Watson, correctly points out that almost daily, one can find reports of such racial
injustice in healthcare throughout the United States. Id.
4

INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES, UNEQUAL TREATMENT

-

CONFRONTING RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN HEALTH CARE 80-214 (2003)

[hereinafter 10M].
See id. (compiling over 100 studies from the last 10 years of racial and ethnic
disparities). Note, however, that even larger literature reviews on this issue have been
published by others. See generally Robert M. Mayberry, Racial and Ethnic
Differences in Access to Medical Care, 75 MEDICAL CARE RES. & REV. 108 (2000);
H. Jack Geiger. Racial Stereotyping and Medicine: The Need for Cultural
5
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ordinary citizens can no longer ignore the fact that our nation focuses
on the color of one's skin and the national origin of one's ancestors still
largely determine the quality of health care a patient receives. This fact
of continuing racial injustice is particularly shocking in an America that
now imagines it long ago rid itself of overt racial discrimination and
inequality. 6 Health disparities data confirm that we have not.
After controlling for differences among the races in
socioeconomic status, health insurance, access to health care and
geographic differences, the evidence still shows that Blacks and
Latinos receive fewer and inferior clinical services than whites,
irrespective of whether those services are for treatment of
cardiovascular disease, 7 cancers, 8 mental illness, 9 pre-natal carel ° or
HIV/AIDS.' 1
Although African Americans, Latinos and Native
Americans suffer and die from diabetes at significantly higher rates
than do white Americans, studies reveal the disease is not adequately
managed among minority patients.12 Less is known about disparate
care for those of Asian and Pacific Island descent, although the
Competence, 164

CANADIAN MED. ASS'N J. 1699 (2001); AMERICAN MEDICAL
ASSOCIATION COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS. Black-white disparities

in Health Care. 263 JAMA 2344 (1990).
6
See
Washington
Post/Kaiser/
Harvard
Racial
Attitudes
Survey,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/sidebars/polls/race071101 .htm
(indicating that 55% or white Americans polled believe minorities experience little or
no discrimination). See also Jeffrey M. Jones, The Gallup Organization, Americans
Hold Improving View of Race Relations in the U.S. (June 30, 2003),
http://www.gallup.com/poll/content/login.aspx?ci=8725.
7 See Josd J. Escarce et al. Racial Differences in the Elderly's Use of Medical
Procedures and Diagnostic Tests, 83 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 948, 950 (1993); A.
Marshall McBean et al, Differences by Race in the Rates of ProceduresPerformed in
Hospitals for Medicare, 15 HEALTH CARE FINANCING REVIEW 78 (Summer 1994).
But see Nancy R. Kressin & Laura A. Petersen, Racial Differences in the Use of
Invasive CardiovascularProcedures:Review of the Literature and Prescriptionfor
FutureResearch, 135 ANN. INTERN. MED. 352, 363 (2001).
8 See generally Peter B. Bach et al., Survival of Blacks and Whites After a Cancer
Diagnosis,287 JAMA 2106 (2002).
9 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, MENTAL HEALTH: CULTURE,

RACE, AND ETHNICITY 37 (2001).
'o See generally Kate M. Brett et al., Differences Between Black and White Women in
the Use of PrenatalCare Technologies, 170 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 4146 (1994).
11 See generally Martin F. Shapiro et al., Variations in the Care of HIV-Infected
Adults in the United States, 281 JAMA 2305 (1999).
12See M. H. Chin et al., Diabetes in the African-American Medicare Population:
Morbidity, Quality of Care, and Resource Utilization, 21 DIABETES CARE 1090, 1093
(1998).
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incidence of several diseases such as Tuberculosis is inordinately high
among this population of Americans.1 3 Ironically, Black, Native - and
Hispanic-American patients have greater access to some healthcare
services than do whites - those un-desirable services such as
amputations, orchiectomies 14 for prostate cancer, 15 and cesarean section17
These are undesirable but necessary services.
deliveries. 16
Undesirable means services a patient would have avoided if an
alternative were available. For example, a man would prefer to keep
his testicles if the disease they carry could be cured. A women would
likely prefer to deliver vaginally if complications were not present.
Any patient would prefer to keep a limb if it could be made healthy,
instead of undergoing an amputation. Undeniably, eliminating these
disparities will require the work of social scientists, 8 health care
providers, 19 politicians, 20 environmentalists, 2 1 clergy, 22 patients 23 and
13

See Centers for Disease Control, Racial/Ethnic Health Disparities Fact Sheet,

http://www.cdc.gov/od/oc/media/pressrel/fs04O402.htm (last visited August 2005)
(providing a discussion of Tuberculosis prevalence by race).
14 Surgical removal of the
testicles.
15 Gerald E. Thompson, Discrimination in Health Care, 126 ANNALS
OF INTERNAL
MEDICINE 910, 911 (1997).
16 See David C. Aron et al., Variations in Risk-Adjusted Cesarean
Delivery Rates
According to Race and Health Insurance, 38 MEDICAL CARE 35, 35 (2000). See also
P. Braveman et al., Racial/ethnic differences in the likelihood of cesarean delivery,
California,85 AM. J. PUBLIC HEALTH 625, 628 (1995).
17 "Undesirable" services are medical treatments that patients would
prefer not to
receive. Amputations, for example, are last resort solutions that most patients would
prefer to avoid. See Aron, supra note 16, at 35. See also Braveman, supra note 16, at
628.
18 See generally NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH OFFICE OF BEHAVIORAL
AND
SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH, STRATEGIC PLAN FOR HEALTH DISPARITIES RESEARCH,

FY 2002-2006, http://obssr.od.nih.gov/Activities/HealthDisp.htm
September 24, 2005).

(last

visited

'9 See generally NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF NEUROLOGICAL DISORDERS AND STROKE,

FIVE

YEAR

PLAN

ON

MINORITY

HEALTH

DISPARITIES,

available

at

http://www.ninds.nih.gov/about ninds/plans/disparities.htm (last visited September
24, 2005). See also Diana J. Burgess et al., Why do Providers Contribute to Health
Care Disparities, 19 J. GENERAL INTERNAL MEDICINE 6 (2004).

See generally H.R. 2553, 108th Cong. (1st Session 2003) (to amend Public Health
Service Act to award grants to treat diabetes in minority communities).
21 See generally Ernie Hood, Dwelling Disparities: How Poor Housing
Leads to
20

Poor Health, 113 ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH PERSPECTIVES A311 (2005), available at

http://www.yubanet.com/artman/publish/article_20418.shtml.
22 See American Health Quality Association, QIO's Faith-Based
Initiatives at
http://www.ahqa.org/pub/media/159_766_3850.cfm. See also Agency for Healthcare
Research and Quality, Church Attendance May Serve as an Additional Health Safety
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many others to comprehensively address the issue. Although the
problem is multi-faceted, this paper focuses on legal solutions. A core
goal of the Civil Rights movement was to use the law as a tool to
address and eradicate inequality and injustice. Although several Civil
Rights Laws proved useful in this effort, an this article focuses
specifically upon Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Title VI was
motivated in large part by the need to address segregation in health care
institutions. 25 Early civil rights litigation and the use of Title VI law
were successful in desegregating hospital emergency departments,
patient wards and medical staffs. Advocates were able to skillfully use
the Civil Rights law to bring down the "Whites Only" signs in hospital
and medical clinic waiting rooms without having to confront the violent
marches, fire hoses and police dogs that were needed to desegregate
lunch counters and schools. Yet, these early victories in health care
civil rights litigation now stand in stark contrast to the helpless state of
American Civil Rights Law as applied to health care discrimination.
Today, Title VI, the very Civil Rights law that was designed in
large part to eliminate racial injustice in hospitals, has proved
singularly ineffective in addressing certain well-known forms of
persistent health care inequalities. Legal scholars have documented
the ineffectiveness of the Department of Health and Human Services'
(DHHS) Office of Civil Rights (OCR) and made recommendations for
changes to the administrative enforcement of Title VI. 26 Still others
Net for Impoverished Black Communities, available at
http://www.ahcpr.gov/research/feb04/0204RA 11.htm.
23 See American Psychological Association, Support for Behavioral and Social
Science Research To Eliminate Health Disparities (June 2004), available at

http://www.apa.org/ppo/issues/behhlthdisparity.html (Last visited August 2005).
24 Prior to the landmark legislation popularly called the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
Congress enacted two other major Civil Rights laws. Moreover, the Civil Rights Act
contains provisions other than Title VI to provide redress for discriminatory conduct.
These include 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983 and 1985 as well as Title VII which addresses
employment discrimination particularly. All these statutes are outside the scope of
this paper except as they have impact on Title VI litigation and enforcement.
25 See DAvID BARTON SMITH, HEALTH CARE DIVIDED: RACE AND HEALING A NATION

(1999) (providing an accessible history of the passage of Title VI and its relation to
the grass roots effort to address hospital segregation see chapter six).

See Louise G. Trubeck, Achieving Equality: HealthcareGovernance in Transition,
7 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 245, 248 (2004) (OCR has hardly developed its Title
26

VI enforcement program since 1980); Sara Rosenbaum & Joel Teitelbaum, Civil
Rights Enforcement in the Modern Healthcare System: Reinvigorating the Role of the
Federal Government in the Aftermath of Alexander v. Sandoval, 3 YALE J. HEALTH

POL'Y., L. & ETHICS 215, 246 (2003) (enlarge the spending authority of OCR and
cross-agency commitment to civil rights).

See also Rene Bowser, Racial Bias in
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have suggested ways in which the Civil Rights laws might be changed
or re-written to do a better job of attacking health care injustice. 27
Owing much to the scholarship that has proposed such incremental
changes in Civil Rights Law and its enforcement procedures, this
article suggests a somewhat more radical approach. It outlines a way to
use American Civil Rights legislation as currently written to bring a
new form of action to combat the racial discrimination that plagues our
health care system. This article advances a strategy that reestablishes a
private individual's right to bring a disparate impact claim under Title
VI, despite the United States Supreme Court's holding in Alexander v.
Sandoval prohibiting these private causes of action, by initiating Title
VI litigation collaterally under the Federal Civil False Claims Act
(FCA). 28
Part I of this article begins with a brief overview of Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act and its enabling regulations. It includes a survey
of this law's application to the health care industry to provide an
outline of the elements of a successful Title VI action, gleaned from
close analysis of the features of Title VI cases that have succeeded.
This section provides the basis for pleading a sound Title VI claim
which is the underlying pre-requisite to pursing the new strategy
proposed in this paper. Part II describes a new strategy to use Title VI:
Title VI claims should be brought against providers and other
defendants by alleging these Civil Rights violators have defrauded the
United States Government in violation of the Civil False Claims Act.
This section begins with an overview of the Civil False Claims Act, an
anti-fraud statute that is being used elsewhere to create private causes
of action where, as in health care, the Government has failed to enforce
the laws as written. Because that statute is subject to abuse and over
Medical Treatment, 105 DICK. L. REv. 365, 382 (2001) (OCR must take its
enforcement obligations seriously); Daniel K. Hampton, Title VI Challenges by
Private Parties to the Location of Health Care Facilities: Toward a Just and

Effective Action, 37 B.C. L. REv. 517, 524 (1996) (citing commentator who says
under Reagan and Bush administrations, OCR virtually abdicated its Title VI health
care monitoring and enforcement responsibilities).
27

See

Joel Teitelbaum

& Sara Rosenbaum, Medical Care as a Public
Accommodation: Moving the Discussion to Race, 29 AM. J. OF LAW AND MEDICINE

381, 383 (2003) (recommending extension of public accommodation definition to
include private health providers as under ADA). See also Sidney D. Watson,
Reinvigorating Title VI: Defending Health Care Discrimination- It Shouldn't Be So

Easy, 58 FORDHAM L. REv. 939 (1990) ("unhitch" possible Tide VI defenses from the
standards set under Title VII law to make adverse impact cases more difficult to
defend).
28 31 U.S.C. §3729.
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use as an enforcement mechanism, Part II also contains a checklist of
areas appropriate for FCA enforcement that distinguish the Title VI
application from others less well suited to fraud prosecution. Finally,
Part II sets out a litigation strategy using the FCA to mount a campaign
against health care discrimination by providers, and ineffective
enforcement of Civil Rights Laws by the government. Part III ends
with brief concluding observations.
I.

THE RISE AND FALL OF TITLE VI LITIGATION IN
HEALTH CARE

The approach to Civil Rights litigation recommended in this paper
begins with an allegation that the underlying laws against
discrimination have been violated. Therefore, it is important to
consider the provisions and limitations of those underlying laws that
have been used historically to fight racial inequality in healthcare. This
section accomplishes this by providing a chronological review of civil
rights cases in health care during three successive periods. The first
group of cases, litigated during the period from Reconstruction to 1964,
rest primarily on allegations that racial injustice in healthcare violated
the United States Constitution. The second group of cases arose after
passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 when Title VI became the most
effective weapon of choice wielded against some forms of
discrimination. This statute and others leveraged the Congressional
spending power to accomplish desegregation of health care facilities.
Finally, the Post Civil Rights Era cases constitute a third category of
Title VI litigation.
These later cases reveal timid judicial
interpretations of Title VI and a marked weakening in the
administrative enforcement of that law.
The purpose of the
chronological review undertaken here is not just to recall history, but
rather to understand principles and strategies that have worked in the
past, and to discern practical ways to use them in future legal assaults
on the inequality in health care delivery that persists to date. Most
importantly, this section concludes that Civil Rights activists
desperately need a new strategy to address racial and ethnic disparities
in health care.
A. Segregation in American Healthcare - An Historical
Overview
Almost as long as there have been hospitals in America, there has been
racial discrimination in health care. The first hospital founded in the
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United States was the Pennsylvania General Hospital, founded in
Philadelphia in 1751 from private funds, donated for the care of the
poor and the insane. In the beginning of its operations, records from
Pennsylvania General did not show that any patients other than whites
were admitted for care. The institution was, in fact called the "First
Anglo Hospital" in the United States. However, historical records
allow us to surmise that the institution eventually began to admit nonBeginning in 1825 and 1829 respectively,
Caucasian patients.
Pennsylvania General began to record the "color" and "national origin"
of admitted patients, confirming that the hospital at some point began
offering services to both Black and white patients. 29 In fact, prior to the
end of slavery in America, the judicial record conveys that AfricanAmericans received a considerable amount of quality medical attention
whenever needed; their health influenced their monetary value as
property of slave-owners. 30 After the Civil War, providing access to
medical care for African Americans took on different implications.
Waves of Blacks migrating from the south began to place pressure on
health care institutions to serve Black and white patients alike. During
Reconstruction, racial segregation, emerged both within hospitals
shared by African-American and white patients, nurses and physicians,
and in the structure of the hospital industry itself. For example, in
1917, Harlem Hospital in New York City hired several Black nurses
and immediately thereafter, several white nurses resigned. Similarly,
when Dr. Louis T Wright was appointed a clinical assistant in the
outpatient department, four white physicians resigned. Dr. Lois Wright
is credited with introducing an intradermal vaccination for smallpox.
He graduated from the Harvard Medical School in 1915, went on to
serve in the Army Medical Corps during WWI, and was a strong
advocate and outspoken leader of fully integrated, publicly funded
hospitals. Dr. Wright became the medical director at Harlem Hospital
29

See

SMITH,

supra note 24, at 199.

Pennsylvania General was unique in its

affiliation with the University of Pennsylvania in that it also provided residency
training for Black physicians, admitting its first African American resident in 1947.
'0 See Wilson v. Shackelford, 4 Rand. 5, 25 Va. 5 (1826) (female slave examined by
"many medical gentlemen" to determine whether health was sound); Belfour v.
Raney, 8 Ark. 749, 3 Eng. 479 (1848) (slave's mother, though owned by different
master, called for physician who attended her son's illness and therefore physician's
fee owed); Wilkinson v. Mosely, 18 Ala. 812 (1850) (action to recover value of
Negro girl hired to defendant who breached his promise to treat her carefully and hire
physician to attend to her in sickness); Murphy v. Mutual Benefit Life & Fire Ins., 6
La. Ann. 518 (1851) (suit on life insurance policy on Negro slave who was attended
"daily" by physicians prior to sale and declared to be in good health).
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in 1938 and was responsible for leadership in both the public and
scientific arena until his death in 1952.
For example, in his excellent book, Health Care Divided, David
Barton Smith chronicles the history of Black-owned and operated
hospitals in America. As Jim Crow emerged, African American
communities built their own hospitals to treat patients excluded from
white institutions. In 1862, the Federal Government provided funds to
the Freedman's Bureau to establish the Freedman's Hospital (now
Howard University Hospital) in Washington, D.C. to treat newly freed
slaves. Hospitals and medical schools all over the nation from cities
such as Chicago's Provident Hospital and Training School for Nurses
(1891);31 Mercy-Douglas Hospital in Philadelphia (1895); Dunbar
Memorial Hospital in Detroit (1918); Lincoln Hospital (1901) in
Durham, North Carolina were opened to train Black nurses and
physicians,32 and to treat their patients excluded from white institutions.
Similar institutions arose to serve other ethnic minorities as well. For
instance, in 1852, the Mt. Sinai Hospital opened in New York City to
serve the growing Jewish immigrant community not welcome at other
New York hospitals. Mt. Sinai purchased its first x-ray machine in
1900 and located it in the same synagogue that housed its operating
room when religious services were not in session. By World War I,
health care in America was offered on a wholly segregated basis. Thus,
early Civil Rights cases were aimed at attacking and dismantling
segregation.
B. The Early Health Care Civil Rights Cases:
Reconstruction To 1964
In 1948, the first reported Civil Rights case against a hospital, a New
York Court acknowledged that the Civil Rights Laws of New York
State effectively prohibited the defendant hospital from denying the
See
Black
History
Month:
A
Medical
Perspective,
http://www.mclibrary.duke.edu/hmc/exhibits/blkhist. The first black-owned hospital
in the United States, founded by Dr. Daniel Hale Williams, also founder of the
National Medical Association which remains the professional society for Black
physicians. Id.
32
See
generally
Howard
University
College
of
Medicine,
http://www.med.howard.edu/abouthucm.htm. Howard Medical School was opened
in Washington, D.C. in 1868 and Meharry Medical College was established in
Tennessee in 1876. Id. Both trained Black and white physicians and remain, to this
day, preeminent institutions for the training of African American physicians and
health professionals. Id.
31
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plaintiffs admission on account of "race, creed or color". 33 Racial
exclusion, however, was not the crux of this early case. Rather, in
Zlotowitz v. Jewish Hospital34 the plaintiff, a Jewish rabbi,
unsuccessfully charged the defendant hospital with violating his First
and Fourteenth Amendment rights to freely exercise his faith. Jewish
Hospital refused to permit Rabbi Zlotowitz to perform circumcisions on
babies born in the hospital, though the Rabbi claimed he was qualified
under Hebrew law to do so. The Zlotowitz Court held that because
Jewish Hospital was private, its decision to disallow Rabbi Zlotowitz's
practice was not state action. Therefore, Jewish Hospital was outside
the reach of state and federal constitutional law.
Ten years later, a North Carolina case similarly focused on the
private status of a defendant hospital to resist another plaintiffs effort
to desegregate a hospital. In Eaton v. Board of Managers of the James
Walker Memorial Hospital, three Black physicians charged that the
defendant hospital had denied them courtesy staff privileges solely on
the basis of their race and color, in violation of §§ 1981 and 1983 of the
Civil Rights Laws and in violation of the equal protection clause of the
Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment of the United States.35
Although the defendant James Walker Memorial Hospital had been
established on public land, by the time Dr. Eaton brought suit, the
property was no longer owned by the City and County. Therefore, the
hospital's operations were not the actions of the state and consequently
were not within the reach of the Constitution. The defendant hospital
became "private" in 1901, after receiving a sizeable gift from a private
donor to renovate and relocate the hospital. To accomplish the new
private status, the hospital's City managers conveyed the public land
beneath the relocated hospital to a trust, 36 and then chartered the
hospital as a private corporation.37 The City managers accomplished
this conveyance, declaring "it was desirable that the management of the
hospital be removed as far as possible from the control of local
municipal authorities, subject to changing political conditions, and to
that end charted the hospital as a body corporate." 38 The Eaton case,
Zlotowitz v. Jewish Hospital, 193 Misc. 124, 126, 84 N.Y.S. 61, 63 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1948).

33

34 Id.

35

Eaton v. Board of Managers of James Walker Memorial Hospital, 261 F.2d 521,

522. See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1981, 1983.
36

With a reverter to the City and County in the case of abandonment. See Eaton, 261

F.2d at 522.
37
31

To be operated by the same Board of Managers as before the conveyance.
Id. at 522.
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teaches, therefore, that privatization was one way hospitals managed to
avoid the reach of the early Civil Rights Laws and of the Constitution's
equal protection clause.
A state-owned mental institution in Johnson v. Crawfis used
another avoidance approach. 39 There, an African-American minor
sought declaratory and injunctive relief for the defendant hospital's
refusal to admit him because he was a Negro. The Johnson court
dismissed this case, rejecting the plaintiff s claims that the hospital had
violated the due process and equal protection clauses of the
Constitution or the laws of the United States. According to the
Johnson Court, the plaintiff had been denied admission because he was
merely mentally defective, rather than suffering from psychosis that
required hospitalization. Moreover, the hospital explained, the plaintiff
minor was denied admission because there were no available beds for
Negro patients specifically. According to the Arkansas court in
Johnson, this explanation showed the defendant hospital did not
exclude the plaintiff because of his race alone. Since the defendant
hospital's Superintendent could properly exercise his discretion not to
accept patients beyond the hospital's capacity, no unconstitutional
discrimination had occurred.4 ° Pointing to the fact that Negro patients
were regularly admitted into the defendant hospital, the Johnson Court
declined to find the exclusion in this case was based on race. The
Johnson Court acknowledged that the plaintiff also raised the question
of whether the defendant's system of segregating patients by race was,
indeed permissible under the U.S. Constitution. The Johnson Court
declined to reach this issue, finding that the plaintiff did not properly
bring the issue of segregation before the court in his Complaint.4 '
Arguments based on the equal protection clause alone, were ineffective
to combat racial segregation in American hospitals by the middle of the
Twentieth Century.
A new litigation approach emerged by the close of World War
II. The United States Congress became a full participant in establishing
dejure, segregated health care, with the passage of the Hill-Burton Act
in 1946. Enacted as part of the Public Health Service Act, the
"Hospital Survey and Construction Act" ("Hill-Burton Act" for short)
required hospitals using federal funds for construction and renovation
to meet two conditions: first, they had to provide a "reasonable
volume" of indigent care and second, hospitals had to do so on a non39

Johnson v. Crawfis, 128 F.Supp. 230 (E.D. Ark. 1955).

40

Id. at 234.

41

Id. at 239.
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discriminatory basis as part of their community service. 42 However,
when the Hill-Burton Act passed, it was modified by a regulation
which qualified the non-discrimination or "community service" and
"reasonable volume" preconditions to the receipt of federal
construction funds with the language of the following explicitly
discriminatory exception:
[B]ut an exception shall be made in cases where separate
hospitalfacilities are providedfor separatepopulation
groups, if the plan makes equitableprovision on the basis
of needfor facilities and services of like qualityfor each
' 43
such group."
Thus, the federal statute that provided federal dollars to build and
expand hospitals, also codified the doctrine that ensured the public
funds would be spent on separate and unequal hospital and health care
throughout the nation. This statutorily-sanctioned, and federallyfunded segregation persisted from 1946 until November 1, 1963 when
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals declared the discriminatory
separate but equal language of the Hill Burton Act un-Constitutional in
the watershed case, Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital.44
The Simkins case was brought by six African-American
physicians, three African-American dentists and two African-American
patients who sued collectively to raise not only Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendment challenges to the Constitutionality of the two defendant
hospitals' segregation policies,45 but also to challenge the U.S.
Congress' exercise of its spending power under the Hill-Burton Act.
After reviewing the substantial appropriations each defendant hospital
had received for construction and renovation under the Hill-Burton Act,
and the way in which the statute's separate-but-equal exception
operated, the Simkins Court effectively reversed the earlier Eaton
case, 46 and put to rest the question of whether these hospitals
42 U.S.C.A. §291 (c)(e)(2).
volume" requirement.
42

This is the statute that contains the "reasonable

41 See 42 C.F.R. §53.112. This is the regulation that describes what hospitals must do

to meet the "reasonable volume" requirement.
44 Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital, 323 F.2d 959, 969 (4th Cir. 1963).
45 Simkins, 323 F.2d at 960-61. The Simkins case challenged staffing and admissions
procedures at the Long Hospital and the Cone Hospital, two non-profit hospitals, both
located in Greensboro, North Carolina.
46 Id. at 970. Importantly, after losing his first case challenging segregation at the
James Walker Memorial Hospital, Dr. Hubert A. Eaton filed a second action,
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participating in the Hill-Burton program engaged in state action by
stating:
Here, the most significant contacts compel the conclusion
that the necessary 'degree of state (in the broad sense,
including federal) participation and involvement' is present
as a result of the participation by the defendants in the hillBurton program. The massive use of public funds and
extensive state-federal sharing in the common plan are all
relevant factors. .

.

. But we emphasize that this is not

merely a controversy over a sum of money. Viewed from
the plaintiffs' standpoint it is an effort by a group of
citizens to escape the consequences of discrimination in a
concern touching health and life itself. As the case affects
the defendants it raises the question of whether they may
escape constitutional responsibilities for the equal treatment
of citizens, arising from participation in a joint federal and
state program allocating aid to hospital facilities throughout
the state.... Our concern is with the Hill-Burton program,
and examination of its functioning leads to the conclusion
that we have state action here. .

.

. Such involvement in

discriminatory action 'it was
the design of the Fourteenth
47
Amendment to condemn.'

The Simkins Court concluded that the separate but equal provisions of
Hill-Burton were flatly unconstitutional under both the Due Process
clause of the Fifth Amendment, and the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
David Barton Smith recalls the impact the Simkins decision had
on the debate that had been taking place in Congress on proposed
legislation that would later become Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
challenging the same discriminatory procedures, this time basing the challenge on the
state's extensive involvement in that hospital's operations as outlined in the Simkins
decision. In the second case, relying upon Simkins and the Supreme Court's new
view of 'state action" as expressed in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365
U.S. 715, 726 (1961), Dr. Eaton prevailed and the Fourth Circuit held James Walker
Memorial Hospital's conduct involved state action and was indeed subject to the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments). See Eaton v. Grubbs, 329 F.2d 710, 715 (4th Cir.
1964).
47 Simkins, 323 F.2d at 967-968.
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48

1964.
In March 1964, the United States Supreme Court denied
certiorarito defendant hospitals' appeal of the Fourth Circuit's Simkins
decision, 49 Congress recognized this denial of certiorari as a clear
signal that the United States Supreme Court also viewed the 'separate
but equal' doctrine as unconstitutional. This gave the federal legislature
the final impetus to pass the Civil Rights Act and legislatively
dismantle the now discredited 'separate but equal' doctrine under
United States law.
These early civil rights cases are instructive in the effort to
employ Civil Rights Law today. First, taken together, the two Eaton
cases, Johnson, Simkins and Zlotowitz demonstrate a progressively
increased focus on the issue that initially appeared to be the core
strength of segregationist hospitals' defenses against constitutional
challenges: the absence of state action. After losing the early civil
rights cases on this basis, the civil rights litigants returned to court
repeatedly with new arguments designed to address the issue that had
spelled defeat in earlier cases. Second, the litigants employed lessons
from cases outside the hospital context. In Simkins, the Burton v.
Wilmington Parking Authority case provided focus on government
owned land to draw the analogy between state involvement in the
context of a privately owned restaurant and in hospital operations.
Third, the collective leadership of minority professionals was most
effective when physicians and dentists sued not only to vindicate their
own interests but united with patients to address discrimination against
them as well. Finally, these early cases were ultimately successful
because the targeted injustice was clear: all civil rights litigation was
aimed at eliminating segregation in hospitals. The cases focused on the
inequality that arose because hospitals treated minority and majority
citizens separately. To be sure, some of the success that resulted from
this line of cases was due to changing morals and views. Tolerance for
health care discrimination was weakening as evinced by litigants
challenging discrimination on state law grounds that previously would
have failed. 50 Even the advantage of changing attitudes towards
48 See SMITH, supra note 24 at 101 (providing references to Congressional Record

entries by Senators Jacob Javits and Kenneth Keating).
49 Moses H Cone Memorial Hospital v. Simkins, 376 U.S. 938 (1964).
50 See Washington v. Blampin, 226 C.A.2d 604, 606, 38 Cal. Rptr. 235 (1964)
(holding state law prohibition against discrimination by 'business establishments'
applies also to physicians). See also Arnett v. Seattle General Hospital, 65 Wash.2d
22, 395 P.2d 503, 507 (1964) (affirming State Board's decision to require hospital to
accept employment application of Black applicant and offer first vacant job to her to
rectify discriminatory employment practice).
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discrimination may be used in litigation today. 5 1 If Civil Rights law is
to be used effectively once again in health care litigation, litigants must
1) learn from the unsuccessful cases by refining legal arguments to
focus subsequent arguments on the areas of weakness revealed in
previous litigation; 2) draw analogies from cases outside the precise
area of hospital sponsored discrimination; 3) identify collaborative
plaintiff constituencies; and 4) above all, work to precisely identify the
discriminatory conduct under attack. These lessons are relevant for
direct attacks on racial disparity under the Civil Rights laws, and for the
collateral litigation approach proposed in this paper; in both cases, the
fundamental strength of the core allegations will contribute to the
overall success of the litigation strategy.
C. The Civil Rights Era: Extending the Legacy of Simkins
and Title VI
The success of the Simkins case and its progeny 52 turned on the finding
that federal spending provided the requisite state action to compel
compliance with the Constitution. The passage of the Medicare and
Medicaid Acts infused the American health care system with taxpayer
dollars to purchase health care for America's elderly, disabled and poor
citizens. Thus, spending power of the federal government provided
ample leverage to attack overtly discriminatory system-level practices.
In Cypress v. Newport News General Hospital,53 a Black
physician brought a class action suit on behalf of himself and his
patients, in order to successfully challenge the exclusion of Black
physicians from the defendant hospital's medical staff. The Cypress
Court enjoined the private hospital's discriminatory behavior based on
the state's investment of federal Hill-Burton funds. Despite questions
concerning the plaintiff's class standing raised in Coleman v.
Humphreys County Memorial Hospital,54 the Mississippi District Court
in that case enjoined "discriminatory practices" in a public facility
citing the defendant County Hospital's receipt of Hill-Burton funds in
that case. But success of the Simkins arguments did not end with cases
involving federal or state funded institutions. The Simkins case made
51
52

See Endorsing the Concept, http://www.righttohealthcare.org/Simply.htm.
See infra tbl. 1 (providing a listing of Civil Rights cases brought to enforce Title VI

against health care providers since Simkins).
Cypress v. Newport News General and Nonsectarian Hospital Ass'n, 375 F.2d 648,

53

651 (4th Cir. 1967).

54 Coleman v. Humphreys County Memorial Hospital, 55 F.R.D. 507, 509 (N.D.

Miss. 1972).
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possible the enactment of Title VI and gave birth to a tool of
unprecedented potency for fighting racial segregation in hospitals and
health care institutions.
1. Title VI - The Anti-Segregation Weapon of Choice
Title VI provides that ....[n]o person in the United States shall, on the
ground of race, color or national origin, be excluded from participation
in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under
55
any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance."
Historically, the statute has been interpreted to offer plaintiffs two
alternate methods of proving this statute has been violated. The plain
language of the statute provides a "disparate treatment" claim under
which a plaintiff alleges the defendant violated Title VI by treating the
plaintiff differently from other similarly situated individuals. The
disparate treatment claim requires a plaintiff to first prove that the
defendant discriminated against her on a prohibited basis, in violation
of the statute. After the plaintiff makes this prima facie showing of
discrimination, the defendant may rebut this evidence by offering any
legitimate reason for the allegedly discriminatory practice. Upon this
showing by the defendant, the burden shifts to the plaintiff who must
then prove the defendant's proffer of a legitimate reason was merely
pretext for racial discrimination. In short, the plaintiff must show the
defendant's specific intent was to discriminate. While plaintiffs can
prove intent with circumstantial evidence including statistical data, the
fact remains that evidence of discriminatory intent is difficult to
adduce.56 Therefore, plaintiffs have long favored the second type of
claim available 57 under Title VI: the disparate impact cause of action.
A plaintiff pleading a disparate impact claim under Title VI
faces similar burden-shifting requirements as the disparate treatment
plaintiff. First, the plaintiff must discharge its burden to make out a
prima facie case of discrimination. This may be based upon statistical
evidence that a practice or policy has had a disproportionately negative
discriminatory impact. Some courts have reasoned that there is a
statistical threshold sufficient to support a claim of adverse impact
15

Title VII §601, 42 U.S.C. §2000d.

56 See HAROLD S. LEWIS, JR. & ELIZABETH J. NoRMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS LAW AND
PRACTICE

§3.9, at 313 (2nd ed. 2004).

51 See infra Part I.D.1 (providing a discussion of Alexander v. Sandoval and the

Supreme Court's limitations now placed on disparate impact claims under Title VI).
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under Title VI. 58 Other courts have held that a statistical showing alone
is insufficient to establish a disparate impact claim.5 9 Once the plaintiff
has made a prima facie case of discrimination, the defendant must
show a legitimate goal is served by the allegedly discriminatory
practice. Then the burden returns to the plaintiff to show that a less
60
discriminatory alternative is plausibly available to the defendant.
Title VI litigation enjoyed a period of success following the
passage of that statute, in cases where the focus became eliminating
segregation and discrimination, rather than questioning the state's
financial involvement. 6 1 In Marable v. Alabama Mental Health
58

Courts and litigants can gain insight concerning the quantum and quality of

statistical proof required to make out a prima facie case by reviewing disparate
impact cases brought successfully under Title VII and the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA). In Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1997), the
Supreme Court found a state's facially neutral height and weight requirement for
prison guards had a disproportionate impact on women in violation of Title VII. The
disparate impact of these physical standards was demonstrated by the plaintiffs
statistical evidence showing a gross disparity in the rate that women and men were
hired. The state's standards excluded over 40% of the entire female population while
excluding less than 1% of the male population from eligibility. In Berkman v. New
York, 536 F.Supp. 177, 205-06 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), the court found a small statistical
sample that showed an overwhelming statistical imbalance between the number of
women and men passing physical exams for firefighter jobs was sufficient. There
zero percent of women passed while 46% of men passed. In Leftwich v. HarrisStowe State College, 702 F.2d 686, 690-93 (8th Cir. 1986), the plaintiff professor
prevailed in a challenge to the defendant college's plan to reduce the number of
tenured full time faculty members. The court found the exact correlation between
tenureship and the protected class to be compelling. Expert testimony showed the
mean age of non-tenured faculty was 34.3 years but the mean age of tenured faculty
was 45.8 years. Therefore, a plan reserving positions for non-tenured faculty but
eliminating tenured professors had an adverse impact on people over 40 years old, a
protected class under the ADEA. But see Smith v. City of Jackson Mississippi, 125
S.Ct 1536. 1546 (2005) (where Supreme Court found plaintiffs failed to identify
specific employment practice was discriminatory thus numerical disparities
insufficient to prove violation of the ADEA).
59 See United States v. Virginia, 454 F.Supp. 1077, 1086 (E.D. Va. 1978) (the court
considered not only the statistical evidence that height and weight requirements for
State Trooper applicants disqualified more than 98% of all women and only 50% of
all men, but also the evidence that Virginia had never hired a woman state trooper to
conclude the "inexorable zero" established a disparate impact case under Title VI. 42
U.S.C. §2000e-2(a)).
60 See Guardians Ass'n. v. Civil Service Commission of New
York City, 463 U.S.
582, 593, 607 (1983) (holding that even without showing discriminatory intent, proof
of discriminatory effect was sufficient to establish a Title VI violation.)
61 In fact, it is noteworthy that the successful focus on state funding
that worked to
address racial discrimination by hospitals in Simkins, did not translate into similar
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62

Board, for example, patients won their challenge to end segregation
and employment discrimination in mental health facilities based solely
on the Title VI non-discrimination provision and on the Equal
Protection clause of the United States Constitution. However, efforts to
extend the anti-discrimination provisions of Title VI beyond hospital
conduct involving either the denial of staff privileges to minority
physicians, denial of admission privileges to minority patients, or
overtly segregated facilities have been met with little success." Ten
years elapsed between the successful enforcement of Title VI in
Cypress, Coleman and Marabel and the following case discussed below
in which a plaintiff prevailed under Title VI in an action against a
hospital defendant.
D. The Post Civil Rights Era - Lessons in Victory and in
Defeat
The next phase of modern Title VI victories came in three categories.
Although not all staff privileging cases have been successful, several
cases involved litigation contesting discrimination against minority
physicians.
Another successful case raised a challenge to
discrimination against a minority patient.
However, the most
instructive of the Post Civil Rights cases involved a successful
challenge to the impact of a state's discriminatory policies against
Medicaid patients generally.
success in later litigation attempting to address hospitals' discrimination against the
indigent on the same basis. In Cook v. Ochsner, 559 F.2d 968, 973-74 (5th Cir.
1977), a class action suit failed to compel hospitals receiving Hill-Burton funding to
treat all indigent patients where the Court found presumptive compliance with Hill
Burton's reasonable volume requirement. Also, the success of cases alleging racial
discrimination based on the Constitution and Title VI, did not necessarily imply
success in litigation alleging discrimination against the poor. See Simon v. Eastern
Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26, 37 (1976) (Supreme Court
declined to find error in an IRS ruling that granted tax exempt status to a non-profit
hospital that denied care to indigent patients).
62 297 F.Supp. 291, 298 (M.D. Ala 1969).
63 Notably, a series of Title VI cases challenging the disparate impact on minority
communities when hospitals relocated from urban centers to suburbia, failed. See
Jackson v. Conway, 476 F.Supp. 896 (E.D. Mo. 1979) (holding that plaintiffs must
exhaust administrative remedies before filing under Title VI); National Association
for Advancement of Colored People v. Medical Center, Inc., 599 F.2d 1247 (3rd Cir.
1979); Bryan v. Koch, 627 F.2d 612 (2nd Cir. 1980); United States v. Bexar County,
484 F.Supp. 855 (D.C. Tex. 1980). See infra Part III.D (providing a discussion of
these cases).
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In Chowdhury v. Reading Hospital and Medical Center,64 a
physician who was "not of the Caucasian race" alleged racial
discrimination when the defendant hospital declined to extend staff
courtesy privileges. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals held in
Chowdhury that the plaintiff did not have to exhaust administrative
procedures before bringing a private action seeking injunctive relief for
disparate treatment under Title VI. 65 After another ten years, in 1992,
the United States Department of Health and Human Services ( HHS)
won a qualified victory in a case raising similar staff privileges issues
on an institutional, not individual basis. In United States v. Harris
Methodist Fort Worth,"

HHS sought to execute a search of the

defendant hospital's peer review and credentialing records as part of an
investigation of the hospital's compliance with Title VI. The Fifth
Circuit held that Title VI's broad prohibition against discrimination
indeed applies to forbid hospitals from discriminating against
physicians in staff privileges decisions. However, the Court also held
the scope of the HHS investigation and records search was limited by
the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 67
The
Harris Methodist and Chowdhury cases are important because they
permit Civil Rights law to be applied to fight discrimination against
minority physicians who must play a crucial role in order to succeed in
the fight against unequal and unjust health care delivery. A third staff
privileging case from the Sixth Circuit 68 adds further breadth to the
Title VI protections against physician staffing discrimination.
In Fobbs v. Holy Cross Health System, 6 9 an African-American
specialist in obstetrics, gynecology and perinatology alleged that
summary suspension of his privileges to perform intra-abdominal laser
surgery violated Title VI. Moreover, Dr. Fobbs alleged that the
discrimination he suffered also disadvantaged his patients-the
intended beneficiaries of Medicare and Medicare funding -- on the
basis of race. 70 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed dismissal
of Dr. Fobbs' Title VI claim, holding that the physician was not
required to plead he was the intended beneficiary of the federally
funded hospital program in order to state a claim for disparate
Chowdhury v. Reading Hospital and Medical Center, 677 F.2d 317 (3rd Cir. 1982)
Id. at 321.
66 United States v. Harris Methodist Forth Worth, 970 F.2d 94, 96 (5th Cir. 1992).
67 Id. at 99-100.
68 Linton v. Comm'r of Health & Env't, Tennessee, 65 F.3d 508 (6th Cir. 1995)
64
65

(holding nursing home bed certification policy violated Medicaid Act).
69 Fobbs v. Holy Cross Health Sys. Corp., 29 F.3d 1439, 1442 (9th Cir. 1994).
70

Id. at 1447- 48.
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treatment. 7 1 The Fobbs Court was unsympathetic, however, to Dr.
Fobbs' claim that he also represented his patients' interests as the
72
incidental or third party beneficiary of federal funding on their behalf.
Dr.Fobbs' personal, disparate treatment claim survived summary
judgment while the disparate impact claim he brought on behalf of his
patients did not. The lesson for future Title VI litigants from the Fobbs
case is that physicians, along with their patients must sue in order to
state a disparate impact claim on their behalf, as litigants in the early
civil rights cases such as Cypress, Marable, and Coleman
demonstrated. This is the model that should be followed in future Title
VI litigation.
In addition to the Chowdhury, HarrisMethodist and Fobbs staff
privileging cases, an immigrant patient prevailed in a Title VI case that
did not involve physician privileging issues. In Atakpa v. Perimeter
OB-GYN Associates, P.C. 73 the Northern District of Georgia
considered a Title VI challenge to the HIV testing policy of an
obstetrics and gynecology clinic in Atlanta, Georgia. Mrs. Esther
Atakpa, an immigrant to the United States from Nigeria, alleged the
defendant clinic discriminated against her on the basis of her national
origin when it refused to provide pre-natal care to her unless she
submitted to HIV testing. According to the plaintiff, Perimeter did not
terminate treatment for non-African patients who refused HIV testing.
74
Mrs. Atakpa alleged that this disparate treatment violated Title VI.
The reported case arose on the plaintiffs motion for summary
judgment. After noting the plaintiff would have to show discriminatory
intent to prevail on her disparate treatment claim,75 the Atakpa Court
found that the question of whether the plaintiffs treatment was
terminated because she was Nigerian or because she was non-compliant
presented a disputed fact issue.7 6 Although Mrs. Atakpa lost her
summary judgment motion in this case, the court clearly acknowledged
that her claim was cognizable under Title VI. 77 For this reason, Mrs.
Atakpa's case is an example of the continued viability of private causes
of action alleging disparate treatment in violation of Title VI.
"' Id. at 1447.
72

Fobbs, 29 F.3d at 1450. See also Doe v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 788 F.2d 411,420 (7th

Cir. 1986) (holding Korean doctor whose hospital privileges were terminated was not
intended beneficiary of federally funded program, therefore, his Title VI claim failed).
73 Atakpa v. Perimeter OB-GYN Assoc., 912 F.Supp. 1566 (N.D. Ga. 1994).
" Id. at 1574.
75 See Guardian Ass'n v. Civil Service Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 584 (1983).
76 Id. at 1575.
77 Id.
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Perhaps the most instructive of the Post-Civil Rights Era cases
is Linton v. Comm'r of Health and Environment of Tennessee;7 8 Linton
provides a template useful for the type of challenges this paper argues
should now be lodged against discriminating health care providers as
part of the "new strategy" advocated herein. Linton was a class action
brought by minority Medicaid-eligible plaintiffs. The Linton plaintiffs
challenged the limited bed certification policy used by Tennessee
nursing homes. Tennessee's policy allowed nursing facilities to spot
identify certain beds for Medicaid participation, while isolating other
beds for private-pay patients.79 In 1990, the Tennessee District Court
found this policy violated the Medicaid Act and Title VI.
The Court finds that the plaintiff has established by
a preponderance of the evidence that the Tennessee
Medicaid program does have a disparate and adverse
impact on minorities. Because of the higher incidence of
poverty in the black population, and the concomitant
increased dependence on Medicaid, a policy limiting the
amount of nursing home beds available to Medicaid
patients will disproportionately affect blacks.
Indeed, while blacks comprise 39.4 percent of the
Medicaid population, they account for only 15.4 percent of
those Medicaid patients who have been able to gain access
to Medicaid-covered nursing home services. In addition,
testimony indicates that the health status of blacks is
generally poorer than that of whites, and their need for
nursing home services is correspondingly greater. Finally,
such discrimination has caused a "dual system" of long
term care for the frail elderly: a statewide system of
licensed nursing homes, 70 percent funded by the Medicaid
program, serves whites; while blacks are relegated to
substandard boarding homes which receive no Medicaid

subsidies. 80
The Linton Court then ordered the state to submit a plan to
address the disparate impact issue. In July 1990, the District Court
78
79
80

Linton v. Commissioner, 65 F.3d 508 (6th Cir. 1995).
Id. at 511.
Linton v. Carney, 779 F.Supp. 925, 932 (M.D. Tenn. 1990).
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entered an order adopting the state's submission in its entirety. 8 After
licensed nursing homes successfully petitioned to intervene, the plan
was modified and again challenged in 1995.82 The Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals declined the nursing homes' invitation to dismiss the
plaintiffs' Title VI claims. The Linton Court refused to disturb the
earlier District Court decision, holding that "Tennessee's policy of
allowing Medicaid participating nursing homes to certify fewer than all
available beds for Medicaid participation was contrary to federal law,
created a disparate impact upon minority Medicaid patients, and
violated federal statutory Medicaid Requirements." 83 The Linton case
teaches at least three lessons to future Title VI litigants.
First, the Linton plaintiffs identified and attacked a precise
policy that had disparate impact on minority patients. The limited bed
policy provided a clear target for the averments of discrimination,
rather than generalized claims of unfair treatment. Second, the
plaintiffs provided clear statistical evidence to show the disparate
impact they alleged. From the outset, the District Court knew the
proportion of Blacks in Tennessee's Medicaid population; what
percentages of Tennessee's participating nursing homes used the
limited bed policy; and the percentage reduction in nursing home bed
availability that resulted from the Tennessee policy. To the extent that
the Linton Court wanted to speak in terms of the numerical significance
or quantifiable impact of the limited bed policy including the number of
beds that otherwise would have been available to Medicaid patients, the
Linton litigants supplied that information. Third, beyond the numbers,
the Linton litigants made their case about real, live, identifiable nursing
home patients who suffered as a direct result of the limited bed policy.
The District Court opinion included the story of Mrs. Belle Carney, an
89 year-old African American woman who suffered from Alzheimer's
disease, who was denied a suitable nursing home placement because of
her Medicaid status due to the limited bed policy. Because of the
policy, Mrs. Carney's nursing home bed was repeatedly de-certified,
forcing Mrs. Carney to move from one inadequate nursing home
placement to another, until finally she required emergency
hospitalization. 84 The true impact of the limited bed policy became real
when the Sixth Circuit related the story of Mrs. Mildred Linton who
81Linton

v. Commissioner, No. 3-87-0941, 1990 WL 180245, at *1 (M.D. Tenn. Jul.
5, 1990).
82 See generally Linton, 65 F.3d at 508.
8'Linton, 1990 WL 180245, at * 1.
84 See Linton, 779 F.Supp. at 928.
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had to move from her home of four years because her bed in the Green
Valley Health Care Center was de-certified under the Tennessee limited
bed policy. 85 Future Title VI cases will more likely succeed if they
include the 1) precisely targeted allegations of disparate impact; 2)
supported by statistical evidence of the disparate impact alleged; and 3)
demonstrated by detriment suffered in the lives of real people who are
part of the plaintiff class. Beyond the practical lessons from Linton, the
proposition for which this case stands is a beacon to guide future Civil
Rights litigation aimed at addressing racial inequality in health care
delivery. Significantly the Tennessee District Court's conclusion that
the Tennessee limited bed policies violated Title VI was challenged
twice at the District Court level and twice in the Sixth Circuit. Each
time, the Title VI holding remained undisturbed. Linton, therefore,
stands for the proposition that state policies which limit access to care
for Medicaid patients, and thus have a demonstrably disparate impact
on minority patients, violate Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
The plaintiffs' success in Linton, Fobbs, and Atakpka must be
viewed within the limitations of other recent defeats to civil rights
claims brought against health care providers. A brief overview of those
cases follows.
1. Lessons from Recent Civil Rights Defeats in Health Care
Despite large and significant changes brought about during these early
phases of civil rights litigation and legislation, there have been three
notable categories of cases in which plaintiffs asserting civil rights
claims against health providers have not been met with success. Cases
involving physician staff privileges, alleged discrimination against
health care employees and challenges to hospital relocation or
consolidation are helpful to gain an understanding in this area despite
their mixed results.
a)
Physician Staff Privileges and Employment Cases
Courts have not been uniform in their handling of staff privileging
cases brought under Title VI. The Chowdhury, Harris Methodist and
Fobbs cases discussed above must be compared to other staff privileges
cases where courts have been generally dismissive of physician claims
of discrimination under Title VI. The cases turn on the question of
whether a physician is an intended beneficiary of Title VI protections.
Where courts find there is no nexus between the allegedly
85

See Linton, 65 F.3d at 511.
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discriminatory practice and the use of federal funds, physician claims
have failed. 86 To the extent that staff privileging cases are to succeed
as a tool in the fight against racial disparity in health care, litigants will
have to emphasize the basic premise that increasing representation of
minority physicians in health care delivery is a crucial lynchpin in
increasing access and decreasing discrimination against minority
patients. In fact, "discrimination against [minority] doctors imports
discrimination against their patients [who are] . . . the primary
beneficiaries . . ,87 Put another way, "by extending staff privileges
only to those physicians who traditionally do not accept minority,
Medicaid or under-insured patients, an institution's staff privileging
policy has the impact of restricting the [number] of minority patients
who [may] utilize"8 8 its facility.89 Thus far, this argument has not been
successfully advanced in Title VI cases. If it is to succeed in future
cases, litigants will have to address the concern expressed in Fobbs
when the court dismissed the third party beneficiary claims, asserting
that "Dr. Fobbs has not explained why he rather than his patients
should receive money damages for injury inflicted on his patients."
Physician staff privilege cases are to be distinguished from a
small group of Title VI cases that universally fail. In cases where
employees of health institutions attempt to file discrimination claims
86

See Doe v. St Joseph's Hospital, 788 F.2d 411, 420 (7th Cir. 1986) (dismissing

Korean-American doctor's Title VI claim. Although plaintiff alleged racial
discrimination claim under 42 U.S.C. §1981, he failed to state a Title VI claim
because no allegation physicians are intended beneficiaries of Title VI). See
Vuciecevic v. MacNeal Mem'l Hosp., 572 F.Supp. 1424, 1430 (N.D. Ill. 1983)
(dismissing Serbo-Yugoslavian doctor's Title VI claim for failing to state a cause of
action where no "logical connection between use of federal funds and the practice
toward which the agency action is directed"); Bhatt v. Uniontown Hosp., No. 832455, 1986 WL 30681, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 20, 1986) (dismissing MD's Title VI
claim where no evidence that his failure to receive staff privileges affected primary
beneficiaries of federal funding, and, therefore, no private cause of action existed);
Vakharia v. Swedish Covenant Hosp., 824 F.Supp. 769, 777 (N.D. Ill. 1993)
(dismissing Indian doctor's attempt to premise his 42 U.S.C. §1985 claim upon Title
VI where physician is not the intended beneficiary of federal funds); Battle v.
Jefferson Davis Mem'l Hosp., 451 F.Supp. 1015, 1027 (S.D. Miss 1976) (dismissing
Title VI claim where doctor fabricated residency record and had history of mental
health and drug abuse).
87 See Fobbs v. Holy Cross Health Sys. Corp., 29 F.3d 1439, 1447-48 (9th Cir. 1994).
88
89

Id. at 1448.
See generally Cook v. Ochsner, 559 F.2d 968 (5th Cir. 1977) (advancing and

settling this very claim, according to Professor Sidney Watson, who was involved in
the case).
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under Title VI, 90 Section 604 of that statute articulates an exception that
proves fatal to this argument. Title VI does not authorize action "with
respect to any employment practice of any employer, employment
agency, or labor organization except when a primary objective of the
federal financial assistance is to provide employment." 9.1 This "primary
objective" exception makes the distinction between employee and nonemployee physicians in staff privileging cases important. If physicians
are employees of the health care defendant, then there is no colorable
Title VI discrimination claim.
However, where physicians are
independent contractors, a Title VI claim may survive.
b) Medical Student Admission Cases
Closely related to physician privileging cases are cases involving
students or applicants who fail to gain or retain admission to medical
school and residency programs who have sued, claiming Title VI
violations. These students claim that the admissions process has a
discriminatory impact on the number of minority physicians who are
available to provide equitable care for minority patients. These cases
have been dismissed on both the merits and on procedural ground. In
one instance, the Eighth Circuit held that Title VI permits recovery for
disparate treatment in a case filed against a university and that the
plaintiff's claim was not barred by the Constitution's Eleventh
Amendment.92 On their face, the medical school admission cases may
appear to only represent individual plaintiffs' attempts to vindicate their
personal failures.
However, these causes of action may prove
important if minority students are continually denied admissions to
medical schools, increasing the shortage of minority physicians. In that
case, the same arguments concerning disparate impact on minority
patients that apply to physician staff privileging cases will apply here as
well.
c)
Hospital Relocation and Closure Cases
Perhaps the most well-known and therefore disappointing series of
recently unsuccessful Title VI claims involve challenges to hospital
closures and relocations. Because these cases have been extensively
90 C.f. Burks v. City of Philadelphia, 950 F.Supp. 678, 683 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (holding
employees claim against AIDS program director unsuccessful, alleging disparate
impact from his failure to serve program purposes).
'42 U.S.C. §2000d-3 (2001).
92 Fuller v. Raybum, 161 F.3d

516, 518 (8th Cir. 1998).
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analyzed elsewhere, 93 they are mentioned here to make only a few
observations. These cases have been motivated by a traditional view of
what Civil Rights litigation can accomplish: where there is
discrimination, the Civil Rights Law has, in the past, shone a light that
provides a stark contrast between the equality standards that underlie
our Civil Rights laws, and the discriminatory conduct that is caused by
inequality. This has been true in the health care context as well.
Traditionally, when the challenged conduct (e.g. segregating patients or
excluding physicians), is compared to the legal standard requiring
uniform treatment and equitable use of funds, the need for correction is
easy to see and the requisite remedy is straightforward. Even where the
commitment to accomplish the remedy has not been strong, the contrast
between the ideal and the reality always has been. The traditional
approach to hospital relocation has not worked in this fashion.
In NAACP v. Medical Center, Inc.,94 the plaintiffs contended
that the relocation of the Wilmington Medical Center, Inc. from its
urban location would result in 75% of the available beds in inner city
being removed to the suburbs. The plaintiff organizations representing
African American, Puerto Rican and handicapped patients believed that
the planned move plainly violated the traditional standards of fairness
and equality leaving the urban population without access to care.
However, the court in Medical Center, Inc. Court saw viewed the nine
mile journey to the suburbs as one that did not "impose a significant
hardship." 95 The contrast between the challenged conduct and the
standard was not clear. First, the Delaware District Court was sensitive
to the business related explanations the defendant gave for the move.
In fact, this Court intimated that perhaps the challenged conduct was
fairer to plaintiff minority residents
because the patients would receive
96
better care at the new location.
93 See

Daniel K. Hampton, Title VI Challenges By Private Partiesto the Location of

Health Care Facilities: Toward a Just and Effective Action, 37 B.C. L. REv. 517, 518
(1996).
94 Nat'l Ass'n for Advancement of Colored People v. Med. Ctr., Inc., 657 F.2d 1322
(3d Cir. 1981).
95 Id. at 1332.
But see Nat'l Ass'n for Advancement of Colored People v.
Wilmington Med. Ctr., Inc., 689 F.2d 1161, 1169-70 (3d Cir. 1982)(holding plaintiffs
met "prevailing party" standard for award of attorneys fees because Department of
Health, Education and Welfare investigation revealed discriminatory effects of
relocation plan which was voluntarily modified).
96 Nat'l Ass'n for Advancement of Colored People v. Med. Ctr., Inc., 657 F.2d 1322,
1340 (3d Cir. 1981).
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Similarly, in Bryan v. Koch, even where the Second Circuit
acknowledged the inequitable impact of moving a hospital from its
98% minority patient base, the contrast between the legal standard and
the conduct was blurred. 97 In Bryan, the fact of unfairness and
inequality was no longer itself persuasive to compel change. Rather
additional layers of requirements (e.g. the defendant's explanation had
to be pretext) made the previous applications impossible. Nevertheless,
98
there are still lessons to learn from these cases.
First, these cases correctly sought to address macro-level, not
micro-level forms of discrimination.
These cases challenged
statistically observed and demonstrable trends that had impact on entire
population of minority citizens. Second, these cases are prosecuted
through a collaboration of groups of individual patients, professional
providers and advocacy organizations. Third, these cases identified
violations of underlying statutes - in Homer G. Phillips Hospital v. St.
Louis, for example, plaintiffs alleged violation of the Public Health
Services Act and Title VI - basing claims of discrimination on notions
of fairness and equality and the rule of law. These cases undoubtedly
miss the mark. These attempts to use Title VI fail because they are
hampered by the procedural and administrative structure of Title VI's
burden shifting regime. Therefore, new ways to bring Civil Rights
claims that are viable within new procedural framework are necessary.
The proposal that follows does not relieve Civil Rights plaintiffs of
satisfying the elements of a viable Title VI claim. Therefore, the next
section briefly reviews those requirements before proceeding to the
newly proposed litigation approach.
E. The Limits of Title VI Litigation
The goal of Title VI is to "safeguard against the use of federal funds in
a way that encourages or permits discrimination."
Even today,
federally funded hospitals, nursing homes, health plans, and even
physicians provide inferior healthcare to Americans who are members
of ethnic minorities even though Title VI was passed to squarely
address the problem of racial segregation and discrimination in health
care. How is this happening? The answer is three-fold: First, part of
the problem lies with the way the law has evolved to heighten the proof
requirements plaintiffs must meet to make out successful Title VI
claims. Secondly, the answer lies with the increasingly complex
Bryan v. Koch, 627 F.2d 612, 617 (2d Cir. 1980).
98 Id. at 616.
97
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sources of racial disparity in health care. Rather than simple
segregationist inequality, the sources of inequality have become more
subtle and complex. Finally, the answer lies partly in the decreased
funding and commitment demonstrated by the Office of Civil Rights
(OCR), the administrative agency charged with Title VI enforcement.
All three of these factors have been discussed extensively in existing
literature. Therefore, the following discussion addresses the current
law, procedure and climate for Title VI enforcement only by way of
review to establish the building blocks for the new strategic arguments
that follow.
1. The "Shifting Sands" Beneath Title VI Jurisprudence
Persistent discrimination is occurring in American health care,
notwithstanding the fact that since 1964, Section 601 of Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act has prohibited racial discrimination by federally
funded programs.99 The Supreme Court has interpreted this section of
Title VI to prohibit intentional disparate treatment on the basis of race
or national origin.' 00 Moreover, Section 602 of that Title authorizes
federal agencies to "effectuate the provisions of [§601] . . .by issuing

rules, regulations, or orders of general applicability."' 0'1 Therefore, the
Supreme Court has also recognized that Title VI permitted federal
agencies to promulgate regulations prohibiting discrimination due to
the unintentional, disparate impact of facially neutral practices and
policies. 102 In GuardiansAssociation v. Civil Service Commission, the
Supreme Court read Title VI to prohibit both disparate treatment and
impact violations, and to clearly imply a private cause of action under
9 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2001).
1oo See Guardians Ass'n. v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 593 (1983)

(containing a suit by minority police dept applicants challenging disparate impact of
examination). Although no opinion commanded a majority, all agreed that Section
601 prohibits intentional discrimination. Majority also held proof of discriminatory
effect sufficient to make Title VI claim.
101 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (2001).
102 See Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 292-93 (1985) (confirming Guardianscase
provided "a two-pronged holding on the nature of the discrimination proscribed by Title
VI . . . . First, the Court held that Title VI itself directly reached only instances of
intentional discrimination. Second, the Court held that actions having an unjustifiable
disparate impact on minorities could be redressed through agency regulations designed to
implement the purposes of Title VI. In essence, then, we held that Title VI had delegated
to the agencies in the first instance the complex determination of what sorts of disparate
impacts upon minorities constituted sufficiently significant social problems, and were
readily enough remediable, to warrant altering the practices of the federal grantees that
had produced those impacts.").
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Title VI, though remedies available to private plaintiffs were limited to
declaratory and limited injunctive relief. 103 However, in Alexander v.
Sandoval'0 4 the United States Supreme Court held that while Title VI
permits private individuals to sue to enforce Title VI's prohibition
against intentional discrimination, and despite the validity of
regulations promulgated under Section 602 of Title VI to prohibit
activities that have a disparate impact on the basis of race, Title VI
permits no private right of action to enforce disparate impact
regulations promulgated under Section 602 of the Act. 0 5 In Sandoval,
the Court considered an injunction issued to prohibit Alabama's policy
of issuing driver's exams in English-only. The class action was
brought by non-English speaking citizens and alleged the English-only
policy of the Alabama DOJ violated Title VI by its disparate impact on
non-English speakers. The Supreme Court reversed the injunction
holding the plaintiffs could not bring a private action enforce disparate
impact regulations under Title VI 10 6 because those regulations do not
involve the intentional discrimination expressly forbidden under §601
of Title VI.
Several legal scholars have noted that Title VI cases, whether
they alleged disparate treatment or disparate adverse impact, were
rarely successful. 10 7 To succeed in a disparate treatment claim under
this statute, a plaintiff must prove first that the defendant intentionally
discriminated. This burden of proof is difficult to adduce. It comes in
the form of unwitting admissions or racially biased statements. Such a
"smoking gun" is rarely uncovered in professional settings today.
Given the enormous difficulty of proving intent, plaintiffs have long
favored the disparate impact cause of action available under Title VI.
Notwithstanding the lesser challenge of discharging the evidentiary
burden to make out a disparate impact claim under Title VI, the most
significant obstacle to plaintiffs wishing to bring these disparate impact
claims has little to do with proof. Now that Alexander v. Sandoval has
Guardians,463 U.S. at 584.
Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
105 Id. at 287.

103

104

10 6 Id. See generally Sara Rosenbaum & Joel Teitelbaum, Civil Rights Enforcement in

the Modem HealthcareSystem: Reinvigorating the Role of the FederalGovernment
in the Aftermath of Alexander v. Sandoval, 3 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y., L. & ETHICs
215 (2003) (discussing Alexander v. Sandoval and its implications).

See Sara Rosenbaum & Joel Teitelbaum, Civil Rights Enforcement in the Modem
Healthcare System: Reinvigorating the Role of the Federal Government in the
Aftermath of Alexander v. Sandoval, 3 YALE J. OF HEALTH POL'Y., L. & ETHICs 215,
107

226 (2003).
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eliminated the private avenues for enforcement of Title VI disparate
impact claims, only two alternatives remain. A private plaintiff may
still obtain injunctive and declaratory relief under Title VI for
intentional discriminatory treatment, or vigilant and committed
administrative agencies can enforce the disparate impact regulations
promulgated under Title VI. Unfortunately, there is no evidence of any
such commitment in the current administration. In fact, much has been
written to confirm that where healthcare is concerned, Title VI
enforcement to eliminate racial disparity and injustice is no longer a
priority. 1 8 One commentator has opined that the "timid and ineffectual
enforcement efforts of the government through the Office of Civil
Rights (OCR) at the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS) have fostered; rather than combated, the discrimination that
continues to infect the nation's health care system."10 9 This retreat by
the federal government comes at the most inopportune time. David
Barton Smith has described the medical industry's "adaptations" that
make sources
of discrimination more complex and difficult to identify
10
than ever.'
The Institute of Medicine's Report provides the latest in a
compelling body of data and statistical evidence that confirms what
some call health care "disparities," but what must plainly be seen as
inequality and injustice of the most inhumane sort. The need for a
revival of the legal remedy most precisely tailored and historically
suited to address racial injustice in health care is urgent. The next
section proposes an approach to Title VI litigation intended to effect
such a revival.
108

See David K. Hampton, Title VI Challenges by Private Partiesto the Location of

Health Care Facilities: Toward a Just and Effective Action, 37 B.C. L. REv. 517,
524-25 (1996) (". . . OCR has almost completely abdicated its Title VI health care
monitoring and enforcement responsibilities"); Sidney D. Watson, Health Care in the
Inner City: Asking the Right Question, 71 N.C. L. REv. 1647, 1669 (1993) ("The
most fundamental shortcoming of OCR's Title VI enforcement effort is that it has
produced no data for evaluating Title VI compliance").
109 Vemellia R. Randall, Racial Discriminationin Health Care in the United States as
a Violation of the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial
Discrimination,14 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 45, 72 (2002) (stating that OCR has not
sufficiently prepared its investigative staff to identify and confront instances of
discrimination).
110 See generally Fox Update,
http://newsweaver.ie/foxbusinessupdate/earticleOO0308770.cfm?x=bl 1,0,w.
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II. USING THE CIVIL FALSE CLAIMS ACT TO ENFORCE
TITLE VI PROHIBITIONS AGAINST DISCRIMINATION IN
HEALTH CARE
This article proposes that private individuals resume filing disparate
impact Title VI claims indirectly, despite the Supreme Court's holding
in Alexander v. Sandoval, by using a vehicle under the Civil False
Claims Act (FCA) 111 called a "false certification claim." If successful,
this approach would not only allow private parties to resume
prosecuting disparate impact cases under Title VI, but it would also
permit suit against any type of provider, ranging from large networks,
to sole practitioners, to government entities. These providers would be
held accountable for the disparities caused by their systems-or carelevel policies, based on statistics, studies and data already available
today. The mechanics of bringing a false certification claim is best
understood in two steps. First, I explain how an ordinary FCA claim
works. Second, I explain the "false certification" variant of an FCA
claim which is the vehicle that would allow Title VI, disparate impact
claims to be privately prosecuted as fraud.

"' See 31 U.S.C. §3729 (2001) et seq. The FCA provides in pertinent part, as
follows:
(a) Liability for certain acts. Any person who:
(1) knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, to an officer or
employee of the United States Government or member of the
Armed Forces of the United States a false or fraudulent claim for
payment or approval;
(2) knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used a false record
or statement to get a false or fraudulent claim paid or approved by
the Government;
(3) conspire to defraud the Government by getting a false or fraudulent
claim allowed or paid
(7)

knowingly makes, uses or causes to be made or used, a false record
or statement to conceal, avoid, or decrease an obligation to pay or
transmit money or property to the Government
is liable to the United States Government for a civil penalty of not
less than [$5,500] and not more than [$11,000], plus 3 times the
amount of damages which the Government sustains because of the
act of that person ....
See also Omnibus Consolidated Recessions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub.L.
No. 104-134, §31001(s)(1), 110 Stat. 1321 (1996); see also Civil Monetary Penalties
Inflation Adjustment, 64 Fed. Reg. 47,104 (August 30, 1999).
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1.
An Overview of the Civil False Claims Act
The FCA statute prohibits a government contractor from knowingly
submitting or causing to be submitted, a false or fraudulent claim for
payment to the United States Government. 1 2 In the health care
context, any provider who is reimbursed by the Federal Government, is
a government contractor whose conduct is controlled by the FCA. The
claims for payment in health care are simply the provider's requests for
reimbursement for medical goods or services, submitted to the
Government. These claims for reimbursement are the subject of the
FCA. Under this statute, three elements must be proved for a plaintiff
to prevail on an FCA claim. First, the plaintiff must prove that a claim
or statement for payment was made. Second, the claim for payment
must have been false or fraudulent. That is to say, the plaintiff must
prove falsity. Third, the plaintiff must prove the false claim or
statement was made knowingly. Under this statute, "knowingly" may
mean the defendant had actual knowledge that the claim was false, but
it may also mean the defendant acted in "reckless disregard" or with
"deliberate indifference" to the truth or falsity of the claim submitted.
If proved, violation of the FCA will cost defendant providers a civil
penalty ranging from between $5,500 and $11,000 for each individual
claim for payment filed, plus three times the damages the government
has incurred by paying the false or fraudulent claim.
The FCA's qui tam provision makes it particularly attractive as
a vehicle to prosecute Title VI offenses. 1 3 This section of the FCA
creates a private cause of action, allowing individuals to bring suit on
behalf of the United States Government, against those suspected of
fraudulent billing against the public fisc. 1 14 The FCA was originally
enacted in 1863 and was called "Lincoln's Law" because its objective
112

31 U.S.C. §3729 (2001).

113

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1282 (8th ed. 2004) ("Qui Tam" is a truncation of the

Latin phrase, "qui tam pro domino rege quam se ipso in hac parte sequtur." This
phrase describes actions brought by a private party, on behalf of the government. The
approximate translation of the entire Latin phrase is: "he who brings action for the
king as well as for himself.").
114 31 U.S.C. §3730 (2001) (setting out the Private Cause of Action under
the FCA. It
reads:
(b) Actions by Private Persons. (1) A person may bring a civil action for a
violation of section 3729 for the person and for the United States
Government.
The action shall be brought in the name of the
Government. The action may be dismissed only if the court and the
Attorney General give written consent to the dismissal and their reasons
for consenting.... ).
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was to stop fraudulent sales of inferior supplies to the Government
during the Civil War. The statute was intended to encourage private
parties who knew of fraud, to help prosecute that fraud as private
attorneys general, or more colloquially, as a "whistleblower. ' ' 15 The
private plaintiff who brings an action under the qui tam provision of the
FCA is called the "relator" because that person relates facts that
constitute fraud on so that the Government can recover its own money.
In exchange for the inside information about fraud, and the
prosecutorial assistance the Government receives, the FCA allows the
qui tam relator to share in the proceeds of the litigation.
Until 1986, few plaintiffs took advantage of the qui tam
provision. However, in 1986, Congress substantially increased the
percentage share of damages and judgments that a private plaintiff
receives in successful qui tam enforcement. Now, depending on
whether the Government joins the relator's lawsuit to take over the
prosecution, or allows the relator to prosecute the suit independently,
the plaintiff can receive between 15 and 30 percent of the trebled
damages or settlement amount from a case. 116 As a result, qui tam
relators who successfully sue health care providers are regularly
earning tens of millions of dollars for their assistance to the
Government.' 17
115

116

id.
31 U.S.C. §3730 (2001) (stating that the qui tam relator's share under reads as

follows:
(d) Award to Qui Tam Plaintiff. (1) If the Government proceeds with an
action brought by a person under subsection (b), such person shall...
receive at least 15 percent but not more than 25 percent of the proceeds
of the action or settlement of the claim...
(2)
If the Government does not proceed with an action under
this section, the person bringing the action or settling the claim shall
receive an amount which the court decides is reasonable for
collecting the civil penalty and damages. The amount shall be not
less than 25 percent and not more than 30 percent of the proceeds of
the action or settlement and shall be paid out of such proceeds.
Such person shall also receive an amount for reasonable expenses
which the court finds to have been necessarily incurred, plus reasonable
attorneys' fees and costs. All such expenses, fees, and costs shall be
awarded against the defendant.).
117 See John F. Murphy, What Are the Rewards? Examples of Recoveries
by
Whistleblowers, http://www.whistleblowerlawyer.com/reward.htm (showing the DOJ
Annual Report for FY 2004 with sample recoveries such as $22 to the relator in a case
against United Technologies, Inc. involving helicopter contract; $18.5 million paid to
the relator who filed against Lucas Industries, Inc. to allege falsification of gear box
records on Navy fighter jets and Army rocket launchers).
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Health care providers make especially attractive defendants
under the penalty and treble damages structure of the FCA. This is
because penalties apply to each false claim filed by a defendant. In the
case of a health care provider, each time the Government is billed for a
procedure, service or facility use, a potentially false claim has been
filed. Large provider networks may file hundreds of thousands of
claims annually and these, if false, could result in enormous recoveries.
Take this simple example as an illustration: Assume a small, 300-bed
hospital incorrectly claimed reimbursement for needle syringes at some
premium above their actual cost. If the hospital overcharged in this
way for a period of five years, then the hospital could be fined a civil
penalty for each and every time the hospital submitted a claim to be
reimbursed for the inflated cost of a syringe during the relevant period.
Moreover, if an FCA violation is proved, the defendant found liable
under the FCA must pay treble the damages the Government suffered
as a result of the false claims. This is measured as the difference
between what the Government did pay to reimburse the defendant
provider based on the claim submitted, and what the Government
would have paid had the claim not been false. If syringes are ordered
in lots of a thousand, once monthly at a cost of $100 but were billed at
$125, then for each order over the five year period, the defendant could
be held liable for $11,000 for each monthly shipment made during the
relevant five-year period, plus three time $25 for each box of 1000
syringes the defendant ordered. The 300-bed hospital in our example
most likely uses a box of 1000 syringes every day. One can quickly
see that the potential liability the defendant faces grows exponentially
with the number of syringes ordered and the length of the time period
the incorrect billing occurred. As the defendant's exposure to liability
under the FCA grows, so does the size of the private qui tam plaintiffs
percentage share in proceeds from the suit. As a result, plaintiffs have
been active and creative in developing theories of recovery under the
FCA. The false certification claim is an example.
2.
False Certification Claims Under The FCA
False certification claims are a specialized type of FCA claims that
allow plaintiffs to bring an otherwise unavailable underlying charge
against the defendant, because the underlying charge is literally
wrapped inside a false claims allegation under the FCA. Here is how
the false certification claim works. The plaintiff first identifies an
underlying statute, independent of the FCA itself, that a defendant
allegedly has violated. For our purposes, that underlying statute will be
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Title VI of the Civil Rights Act. Next, the plaintiff identifies the claims
for reimbursement that the defendant presented to the Government
during the period when the defendant was not complying with the letter
and spirit of the underlying law - in our case, Title VI and
accompanying regulations. The crux of the false certification claim is
the plaintiffs assertion that the defendant certified, either expressly or
impliedly, 118 that it was compliant with all federal law in order to claim
reimbursement for goods and services from the United States
Government and the Government viewed such a representation as a
condition of payment or reimbursement. If it turns out that the
defendant did not comply with the underlying law, then the defendant's
certification and claim for payment submitted to the Government are
both false and actionable under the FCA.
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals recently affirmed the
appropriateness of applying the false certification action to health care
providers. In United States ex rel. Augustine v. Century Health
Services, Inc.119 the Court held a home healthcare agency company
liable for treble damages and penalties under the FCA for misuse of
Medicare reimbursements withdrawn from the company's Employee
Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP). The Augustine case was filed by a qui

tam plaintiff to allege that the defendants had breached their fiduciary
duty to the ESOP. Citing the Supreme Court's observation that the
FCA is "intended to reach all types of fraud, without qualification, that
might result in financial loss to the Government,"1' 20 the Sixth Circuit
endorsed the implied certification theory of recovery under the FCA.
First, the Court found that the defendant's cost reports contained a
certification that "to the best of its knowledge and belief, [the cost
report] is a true, correct, and complete report prepared from the books
"18 Ideally, the plaintiff can identify a form or document the defendant submitted as part of
the claim for payment which contains an express representation or certification that the
defendant is in substantial compliance with all other controlling law. In our hypothetical,
that certification would apply to compliance with Title VI as well. In other contexts,
plaintiffs have found such a certification when providers submit HCFA form UB-92'2 or
HCFA 1500's to be reimbursed. If this is the case, then an express certification that the
defendant is compliant with federal law will serve as the basis to satisfy the falsity element
of an FCA claim. On the other hand, if no express certification of compliance is available,
the plaintiff may argue the defendant impliedly certified compliance with Title VI and that
the Government would not have reimbursed for medical goods and services if it knew the
defendant was violating the Federal Civil Right Law at the time it requested

reimbursement.
19 United States v. Century Health Services, 289 F.3d 409, 411 (6th Cir. 2002).
120 Century Health, 289 F.3d at 413, quoted in United States v. Neifert-White Co.,
390 U.S. 228, 232 (1968).
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and records of the provider in accordance with applicable
instructions...,,121
Next, the Court reasoned that by making this
certification, the Defendants represented they would comply with
Medicare regulations."' 12 When the Court found the defendants in fact
had violated Medicare regulations that control ESOP expenses, the
Augustine Court was able to conclude that the defendant's costs reports
were false claims for payment, filed in violation of the Civil False
Claims Act. The Court said,
A number of courts have held that a false implied
certification may constitute a false or fraudulent claim even
if the claim was not expressly false when it was filed.
Instead, liability can attach if the claimant violates its
continuing duty to comply with the regulations on which
payment is conditioned. We adopt this theory of liability,
and conclude that the district
court did not err in finding it
12 3
applicable in this case.
In Mikes v. Straus,1 24 the Second Circuit similarly adopted the
false certification theory of recovery under the FCA. In that case,125a
pulmonologist filed the qui tam action against his physician partners,
alleging they violated the FCA by failing to properly calibrate
instruments used to provide medical care for which the federal
government was billed. The gravamen of the relator's claim in that
case was that the defendant's claim for reimbursement under Medicare
was false because it sought payment for services not rendered in
accordance with the relevant standard of care. In this case, the qui tam
relator relied on the defendants HCFA-1500 forms to find the express
certification that said "I certify that the services shown on this form
were medically indicated and necessary for the health of the patient and
were personally furnished by me..."
As this certification is a
precondition of the government's payment, the Mikes Court concluded
any underlying failure to comply with the certification rendered it false
and therefore actionable under the FCA. 126 The Mikes court went
further to endorse the theory of implied as well as express certification,
Century Health Services, 289 F.3d at 414.
122 Id. at 415.
121

123

Id.

124

Mikes v. Straus, 274 F.3d 687 (2d Cir. 2001).

125

Id. at 692.

126

Id. at 698.
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whenever the underlying statute or regulation upon which the FCA
claim is based
expressly states that a provider must comply in order to
12 7
paid.
be
The false certification theory of recovery has been particularly
successful in cases brought to enforce the antifraud provisions of the
Medicare Anti-Kickback statute, and Stark I, II and III legislation. In
Pogue v. American Healthcorp, Inc., 128 for example, a private qui tam
relator filed a FCA suit against his former employer to prosecute
defendant physicians' referrals of Medicare and Medicaid patients to
defendant's centers for treatment. The qui tam relator in Pogue could
not have prosecuted this alleged violation of the anti-kickback and selfreferral laws directly because neither of these statutes creates a private
cause of action. This is directly analogous to the Supreme Court's
decision to quash private causes of actions to prosecute disparate
impact violations of Title VI. In Pogue, the court reasoned that
violations of the anti-fraud statutes were actionable under the FCA
under the false certification theory. Reasoning that the government
would not have paid Medicare reimbursements if it had known the
defendants conduct violated anti-fraud laws, the court concluded the
defendant's claims for Medicare reimbursement filed while in
continuing violation anti-fraud law were false. 129 This theory is
directly applicable to Title VI claims. Although the Courts no longer
recognize a private cause of action under Title VI, to the extent that
health care providers file claims for reimbursement while operating in
ongoing violation of its non-discrimination provisions, those claims for
payment are false and actionable under the FCA. Pogue is somewhat
limited in its reach; however, because of the Fifth Circuit's decision to
imply falsity from an inference that the defendants in that case
deliberately hid their anti-kickback violations from the government
with the intention of obtaining Medicare reimbursements the
government otherwise would not have paid if the defendants' conduct
30
had been revealed. 1
More instructive, however, is a Fifth Circuit qui tam case styled
United States ex rel. Thompson v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp.' 31
127

Id. at 697.

128

United States ex rel. Pogue v. American Healthcorp, Inc., 914 F.Supp. 1507 (M.D.

Tenn. 1996).
129

Id. at 1513.

130 Id.

United States ex rel. Thompson v. Columbia/HCAHealthcare Corp., 125 F.3d 899
(5th Cir. 1997), remanded to 20 F.Supp.2d 1017 (S.D. Tex. 1998).
131
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Two types of FCA violations recognized in Thompson are worth
examining as potential models for Title VI-based FCA claims. The
first does not involve the false-certification theory, but rests on a per se
finding of liability. The Thompson Court found that claims submitted
for reimbursement by providers who were in violation of the Stark II
Law,13 2 at the time their claims were submitted, were per se actionable
as false and fraudulent claims under the FCA. 133 The underlying Stark
Law prohibits physicians from referring to entities that provided
designated health services, and with which either the physician or a
member of the physician's immediate family has a financial
relationship. This statute not only prohibits physician self-referrals, but
it also prohibits entities from billing Medicare for services that are the
result of physician self-referrals.' 34 Therefore, the Thompson Court
reasoned that an entity that knowingly submitted a claim for
reimbursement generated by a physician self-referral, prohibited by the
Stark statute, submitted a necessarily false claim. By analogy, it could
be argued that any publicly funded provider who submits a claim for
reimbursement while operating in a way that "exclude[s] from
participation in, ... denie[s] the benefits of, or.

.

. subject[s] [a person

to] discrimination" on the basis of their race, color or national origin
has submitted a per se false or fraudulent claim in violation of the FCA.
A second strain of reasoning from Thompson may also prove
applicable in the Civil Rights context. The Fifth Circuit approved a
version of the false-certification claim in Thompson that is instructive.
There, the Court read the defendant's annual cost reports as express
certifications that it had complied with all Medicaid and Medicare
regulations. 135 Notwithstanding this representation, the Court also
found the defendant had violated both the Stark Law and the anti132

Id. at 902; 42 U.S.C. §1395nn (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (amended 1992)

[hereinafter "the Stark Law" will refer to Stark I and Stark II which were enacted in
1989 an 1993 respectively but which are together prohibition of the practice of
physician self-referral].
133 Thompson, 20 F.Supp.2d at 1047.
134 The Stark Law, 42 U.S.C. §1395nn(a)(1) (2001). The Stark Law provides:
(A) the physician may not make a referral to the entity for the
furnishing of designated health services for which payment otherwise
may be made under this subchapter, and
(B) the entity may not present or cause to be presented a claim under
this subchapter or bill to any individual, third party payor, or other
entity for designated health services furnished pursuant to a referral
prohibited under subparagraph (A)). Id.
135 Thompson, 125 F.3d at 902.
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kickback statute.136 The anti-kickback statute's criminal provisions
prohibit knowingly paying or receiving any remuneration in exchange
for patient referrals, for goods and services paid for by federal health
care programs.1 37 Unlike the per se liability that attached under the
first theory of liability, here the Thompson court found the defendant's
claims were false because they were inconsistent with the
representation that the defendant had complied with the law. Thus,
these claims were falsely certified as compliant and this discrepancy
made the claims actionable under the FCA. The Thompson Court
emphasized the importance of the fact that the government had relied
upon the defendant's ultimately false representation in making its
reimbursement payments. 138 Applying the Thompson Court's false
certification analysis from this second category of FCA claims to
prosecute Title VI violations will require a similar showing of the
Government's reliance on a representation that the defendant certified
compliance with federal law. Forms required for Medicare and
Medicaid participation such as the HHS-441 require providers to affirm
their willingness to comply with Title VI. This is the type of
documentation may evince the Government's general unwillingness to
pay for discriminatory services. Although the FCA does not explicitly
require the plaintiff to satisfy an injury element, the Government and
qui tam relators will be attracted to prosecuting cases against
defendants who have cost the government money. The treble damages
provision of the FCA turns on a showing that the government was
damaged by the alleged underlying violation. Therefore, the success of
applying Thompson's false certification theory to Title VI claims will
depend upon convincing a fact-finder that the Government relied upon
and would not otherwise have paid to reimburse providers for goods
and services delivered by providers who do not comply with Title VI.
a)
Special Logistic and Substantive Considerations
Applying the Thompson false certification and per se liability models to
prosecute Title VI violations via the FCA will require civil rights
advocates to address some special concerns.
First, the false
certification theory has succeeded where the courts concluded that the
136 42 U.S.C. §1320a-7b (2001) (containing a criminal provision of the Medicare and
Medicaid Anti-Fraud Act referred to herein as the "anti-kickback statute").
137 42 U.S.C. §1320a-7b(a)(1)-(2) (2001) (prohibiting false statements or
representations of material fact in application for federal health benefits, something
not at issue in Thompson).
138 Thompson, 20 F.Supp.2d at 1047.
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Government's decision to pay the claims in question was conditioned
on the defendant's representation that it complied with the underlying
statute. 139 The FCA claim to enforce Title VI must represent either
that the statute conditions Medicare reimbursement on compliance, or
that the Government never would reimburse a healthcare provider who
failed to comply with Title VI. 140 Second, Title VI employs a burdenshifting procedure that must be incorporated into the FCA claim. In
disparate impact cases, after a qui tam relator is able to show prima
facie violation of Title VI's anti-discrimination provision, the relator
will also have to show that it could discharge its subsequent burden to
show there is no feasible alternative policy that would have less of an
adverse impact on racial and ethnic minorities.
There are several advantages to prosecuting Title VI claims by
the FCA. First, the FCA will allow Title VI claims for disparate impact
to be brought by private parties. Second, although the plaintiff will
have to prove the elements of the underlying Title VI claim are
satisfied, this can be done without the administrative requirements to
file a complaint, seek voluntary compliance, and exhaust all the other
administrative remedies required to enforce Title VI through the Office
of Civil Rights. Third, the FCA's scienter requirement relaxes the
intent requirement that a direct Title VI claim might require. Fourth,
the FCA claimant need not prove materiality or direct injury to state a
colorable claim. However, the statute's objective is to redress
fraudulent spending of the public fisc. Therefore, any cognizable FCA
claim must serve this goal. 141
In summary, the Title VI violations most amenable to FCA
prosecution will be those that implicate specific policies and practices
that cause a quantifiable disparate impact on minority patients and
populations, while also resulting in a demonstrable impact on the
Federal treasury because the government would not have reimbursed
for the medical goods or services provided had it known of the Title VI
violation alleged. A final observation is appropriate. Because there are
many cases in which the FCA would be a poor substitute for existing
139 See Mikes v.

Straus, 274 F.3d 687, 700 (2d Cir. 2001).

140 CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES,

HCFA 1450,

available at

http://www.cms.hhs.gov/providers/edi/h1450.pdf (containing a certification that the
provider claiming reimbursement has complied with the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and
this language should prove helpful in fashioning a colorable FCA claim).
141 See United States ex rel. Thompson v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 20
F.Supp.2d 1017, 1048 ("in light of the legislative history and the purpose of the FCA that
submission of such claims for services that were statutorily ineligible for payment under
the Medicare Act constitutes a false claim within the ambit of the FCA.").
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laws that directly control the conduct of health care providers. Here,
the argument that Title VI litigation should proceed under the FCA
must be distinguished. First, the FCA is appropriate where the Federal
enforcement authority has either lost or abdicated its ability to
administratively address the violations of the underlying law. Second,
the FCA is an apt substitute for direct enforcement where the precise
objectives of the underlying law are unambiguous and will be precisely
served by FCA litigants. Finally, where the Federal Government
expressly requires certification that government contractors comply
with a specific statute before receiving reimbursement, the FCA
approach is particularly well suited for prosecuting violators of that
certification.
3. Limits of the False Certification Cause of Action
Notwithstanding the advantages of using the FCA as a mechanism for
revitalizing Title VI to address racial injustice in health care, the
potential for misapplication of the FCA false certification claim
warrants an attempt to distinguish those claims that are suitable for
FCA enforcement, from those that are not. The Thompson defendants
cautioned that the FCA could not to be the "stalking horse" for every
statutory and regulatory
violation, turning the anti-fraud statute into a
"mega-remedy." 142 This must be correct. For example, in United
States ex rel. Joslin v. Community Home Health of Maryland, Inc.143 a
District Court refused to use the false certification claim proposed by a
qui tam plaintiff to enforce state licensing laws allegedly violated by a
home health agency. Therefore, this section provides a short list of
features to distinguish Title VI disparate impact cases as claims that
may be properly enforced through the FCA.
First, Title VI is a federal statute so that FCA enforcement
would not preempt state law in any way. Second, the statutory and
regulatory objectives and provisions of Title VI and accompanying
regulations are unambiguous. Title VI violations do not arise from
good faith efforts to interpret or apply a complex or changing body of
detailed regulatory provisions. This distinguishes Title VI from
attempts to use the false certification claim to prosecute error rather
than fraud. Third, FCA enforcement will directly serve the Congress'
intent in prohibiting the use of federal funds to provide discriminatory
health care and treatment. Fourth, the FCA's qui tam provision will
142

143

Thompson, 20 F.Supp.2d at 1025.
United States ex rel. Joslin v. Cmty. Home Health of Maryland, Inc., 984 F.Supp.

374, 379 (D. Md. 1997).
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allow the government to enlist the help of insiders to identify
discriminatory polices that are subtle, complex and difficult to identify
without the assistance of private participants in litigation. Just as the
government has relied on qui tam relators to help prosecute subtle and
complicated schemes that violate the plain prohibitions of the Antikickback and Stark laws, the FCA will prove useful to root out subtle
forms of discriminatory conduct that plainly violates Title VI. This
paper does not propose to replace existing legal duties or standards of
care with new ones under the FCA. It does not propose to replace a
properly functioning administrative regime, with private litigation
intended to usurp the government's existing exercise of enforcement
authority. To the contrary, the FCA is proposed here as a tool to
enforce Title VI where those charged with its enforcement have fallen
short. In fact, Civil Rights advocates may wish to explore one further,
novel application of the FCA to enforce Title VI: direct actions against
the Office of Civil Rights itself.
4.
Suits against The Government - Suing OCR
The due process protections of the Constitution protect the adjudicatory
process under Title VI. A complainant who files with OCR has the
right to have that agency consider the merits of its charge and failing to
do so creates a property right protected by the Constitution. 44 To the
extent that the evidence is clear that these rights are not being
vindicated, an appropriate solution may include bringing suit against
the Government to compel its enforcement obligations
under Title VI
45
as vindication of beneficiaries' property rights. 1
Others have sued OCR and lost. However, this is not to say that
bringing suit against OCR is necessarily a losing cause. OCR is, as
many commentators have noted, woefully under-funded and under
motivated to use Title VI as a tool to eradicate racial inequality. Most
recently, an individual plaintiff, joined with health care advocacy
groups to bring suit against the Department of Health and Human
Services (DHHS) and the acting director of the Office of Civil Rights
(OCR) in Madison-Hughes v. Shalala. The plaintiffs in that case
alleged the government violated Title VI by failing to collect data and
publish guidelines to carry out its effectively enforce the non144 See Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982).
145

This effort might be supported by a grass roots effort to identify and file numerous

claims of discrimination with the OCR, in order to establish a pattern and practice of
discriminatory non-enforcement. This effort would be reminiscent of the grass roots
campaign that led to the passage and enforcement of Title VI in the 1960's.
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discrimination provisions of Title VI. 146 Their claim was that Title VI
and its implementing regulations required data collection for effective
enforcement of the anti-discrimination law. According to the MadisonHughes plaintiffs, HHS had unlawfully filed to collect data to report the
ethnic distribution of patients treated by federally funded health care
providers; measures of racial integration by health providers. Both the
District Court and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed.
Finding no mandatory requirement that HHS collect statistical data in
either Title VI or its accompanying regulations, 47 the Court dismissed
the claims in this case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The errors
plaintiffs made in Madison-Hughes v. Shalala, provide useful lessons
for us today:
First: Identify the mandates of the statutes and regulations that
govern OCR. Addressing the jurisdiction issue that defeated plaintiffs
in Madison-Hughes, a well-pled complaint must firmly ground the
violations alleged against OCR in the plain language of the statute's
mandates. A federal court may exercise jurisdiction to review agency's
discretion if "the statute provides a meaningful standard against which
to judge the agency's exercise of discretion."
Second, it may be necessary to generate a record of nonenforcement over which Civil Rights advocates have control in order to
prove the OCR's inactivity. Rather than relying upon the OCR to
report the number of cases that have been filed and their respective
disposition, a grass roots effort to flood the OCR with a carefully
coordinated and recorded series of complaints that are all followed
closely may build a record of the type of failure to fulfill a statutory
obligation that may ultimately be actionable.
Finally, the Madison-Hughes Complaint did not include a count
based upon 45 C.F.R. §80.7(b) that allows complaints to ensure Title
VI enforcement. This is a basis of recovery to consider in future
enforcement efforts.
IM.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Rumors of the demise of effective Civil Rights litigation in health care,
are woefully premature. A most troubling series of judicial defeats
have led to justifiable concern among advocates and legal scholars.
See Madison-Hughes v. Shalala, 80 F.3d 1121, 1123 (6th Cir. 1996).
See id. at 1126-27 (dismissing 45 C.F.R. §80.6(b) as a "mechanism of enforcing
the Act . . . at times" making it discretionary and not mandatory). Similarly, the
Court held 28 C.F.R. §42.404(a) does not mandate any routine data collection. Id.
146

141

2005]

A NEW STRATEGY

However, an ever increasing and damning body of evidence of racial
injustice and inequality in American health compel continued diligence
and creativity in the effort to address racial injustice in health care.
This paper proposes the use of a statute that has proved effective to recreate private causes of action, where none previously existed. The
FCA's attractiveness includes its lack of focus on specific injury, the
usefulness of employing the assistance of inside qui tam plaintiffs
motivated by the prospect of their own financial recovery; the
flexibility of proof requirements that avoid administrative complexities
in favor of straight-forward judicial determinations of the underlying
violations; and the statute's treble damages provision.
If the FCA is used to bring actions for which there is substantial
statistical data of disparate impact, then the lessons learned from early
and recent Title VI cases that have met with success can be
incorporated in a statute that is easily applied to the health care context.
It has been said that desperate times call for desperate measures.
Where racial and ethnic injustice in healthcare is concerned, these are
such times indeed.
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Table 1
Plaintiffs' Success in Title VI Health Care Cases
1967 - 2004

1972

Coleman v.
Humphreys
County Mem
Hosp (N.D.
Miss)

Class action v
county hospital by
Black residents to
enjoin operating
discr-iminatory
manner. Held:
Injunction Awarded

Long,
steadfast
r-esistance by
hospital and
county to
change
policies

Yes

20051
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1980
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Bryan v.
Koch, (2 11"

Cir.)

Plaintiff advocates
and unions (3
consolidated suits)
representing Black
and Hispanic
Harlem residents
sue City and state to
seek preliminary
injunction, alleging
closure of
Sydenham Hospital
violates Title VI by
disparateimpact on
minority patients
w/o showing no
alternative available.
Held: Plaintiffs have
shown sufficient
disparate impact to
require answer by
Defendants.
Defendants cite
increased efficiency
and conducted
system wide survey.
Held: Defendant
City showed it
considered
alternatives, no Title
VI success for
Plaintiffs likely.
Disparate impact
evidence not effects
required.

98% of
Sydenham' s
patients are
Black or
Hispanic
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Cir.)

Patient sued for
medical malpractice
alleging Title VI
disparate treatment.
Held: Title VI gives
no right to redress
negligent treatment
bv MD
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1986

Doe v. St.
Joseph
Hospital (7 th
Cir.)

1986

Bhatt v.
Uniontown
Hospital
(W.D. Penn)

Korean-American
MD sues for
termination of staff
privileges based on
national origin
following
confrontation with
another MD who
filed complaint.
Held: Title VI
claim dismissed b/c
MD not intended
beneficiary of
federally funded
programs and
plaintiff alleges no
discrimination vs.
patients b/c of race
MD denied staff
privileges sues
claiming deial
discriminatory.
Held: Title VI
applies to hospital
recipient of
Medicare/Medicaid
but not to privileges
matter where no
correlation between
MD privileges and
receipt of fed funds

[VoL.9.1:793
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1990

Linton by
Arnold v.
Comm'r of
Health and
Environment,
Tenn. ( 6 th
Cir.)

Class action by
Black Medicaideligible patients
excluded from
nursing home beds,
challenged
Tennessee's limited
bed certification
policy under
Medicaid Act's
"distinct part
certification." Policy
allowed SNF spot
certified beds for
Medicaid
participation and
Dist Ct held Title VI
violation, policy
caused disparate
impact on minority
access to nursing
homes. Held: No
need to find whether
disparate impact on
blacks since policy
violated Medicaid
Act.
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23% Tenn
Medicaid
participating
nursing homes
had limited
bed policy;
7% of beds
uncertified
that would've

been

Qualified,
Yes
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1993

Vakharia v.
Swedish
Covenant
Hospital
(N. D. Ill.)

Plaintiff MD from
Bombay, India, sued
hospital alleging
termination of her
staff privileges
violated Title VI
(and other)
prohibition. Held:
MD not intended
beneficiary of
federal funds to
hospital.

[Voc.9.1:793
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1994

Atakpa v.
Perimmeter
OB-GYN
Associates
(N.D. Ga.
1994)

Patient. Nigrerian
immigrant sued
clinic and nursemidwife alleging
national origin
discrimination wlrlt
HIV testing
violating Title VI
and sought summary
judgment.
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Defendant
terminated
plaintiff's
treatment
when she
refused HIV
testing but did
not terminate
non-African
patients who
similarly
refused.

Yes
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Ellis v.
Morehouse
School of
Medicine
(N.D. Ga.)

Medical student
alleged disparate
treatment under
Title VI due to med
school's refusal to
provide transcript
after dismissal from
medical school.
Held: Plaintiff failed
to establish prima
facie case of
retaliation and if he
did, school's
explanation that it
does not give
transcripts if owe
money to school
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MadisonHughes v.
Shalala (6t '

Cir.)

851
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Medicare physical
rehab providers sued
Secy of HHS and
private insurer who
acted as Part B
Medicare carrier
alleging
discriminatory
reimbursement and
other financial
activities. Held:
Title VI does not
apply to programs
administered by
federal agency
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facilities,
Carrier placed
these facilities
on
individualized
not electronic
review for
reimbursement
claims;
increased
denial rate
from 2% to
100% and
admonished
return of list;
placed on post
payment audit
status and
charged with
overpayment
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